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Abstract: Web search engines are a very important mean to fight infor-
mation overload’s consequences, but this makes them the gate to digital 
information of any type and purpose. The cyberspace is accessed through 
such complex and automated tools: software agents execute secret and 
complex algorithms and make information easily reachable or hidden, but 
anomalies and bugs may have serious consequences. Private entities provi-
de such services, on a global (e.g. Google), or local but relevant scale (e.g. 
Baidu). After the Google Spain case, literature on the right to be forgotten is 
growing. This paper aims at go further, investigating both the right to access 
on line information and to be correctly and neutrally indexed by web search 
engines. The law must regulate this topic, making them work in a neutral 
and non-discriminatory way, even if they work cross-borders and are private 
subjects. Otherwise, the Information Society will even more controlled by 
the dictatorship of the algorithm.
1. Introduction
Legal literature on web search engines2 is growing, especially after a landmark decision 
by the European Court of Justice: the judgement in “Google Spain SL and Google Inc. 
v Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD) and Mario Costeja González” (13 
May 2014, “Google Spain case”; European Court of Justice 2014). It held that the 
right to be forgotten applies to search engines; in particular, in the European Union it 
is possible to ask for delisting of web site links from the SERP (Search Engine Results 
Page). Thus, even if a web page is on line and cannot be legally shut down, it may not 
be indexed if certain conditions are met. The ECJ judgement is a landmark decision 
because it makes a division among what can be easily found on the web, on the one 
1. This is the revised version of the paper presented at XXVII World Congress of the IVR - International 
Association for the Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy (Special Workshop on “From Net 
Neutrality to Net Profitability? Law, Politics and the Internet”), Washington DC, July 2015.
2. This paper uses the expression “search engine” to indicate automated web search engines. 
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hand, and what can hardly be found, on 
the other hand. A web content may be pu-
blished, but it does not necessarily imply 
that everyone may rapidly find it, answe-
ring to a reasonable expectation of privacy.
This aspect is crucial in the Information 
Society, because search engines are the 
primary gatekeepers to digital information. 
Another aspect is perhaps even more im-
portant, but it needs deeper investigation: 
is there a legal obligation related to web 
site indexing? In other words, is there a 
right to be indexed?
In fact, if we take into account only what 
happens when a search engine responds 
to a query (as in the case of the right to be 
forgotten), we forget what happens before: 
how does a search engine build its SERP? 
How does it decide what pages can be 
shown and their ranking?
This is not only an antitrust matter, because 
it relates to all subjects whose content is 
published on the web and indexed auto-
matically by search engines. “In an envi-
ronment where consumers are no longer 
passive receivers of information, but in-
creasingly active contributors to the infor-
mation ecosystem, access also concerns 
the (controversial) debate about the entit-
lement of users (as creators) to be integra-
ted into search indexes and ranking lists, 
or at least the possible remedies against 
discrimination in the indexing or ranking 
processes” (Gasser 2006: 232).
Today, a search engine can decide what 
can be accessed on the web; it can hide 
and/or rank information making it hardly 
be found (“By controlling the communi-
cation infrastructure of the Internet, they 
have become information gatekeepers”; 
Laidlaw 2008: 1143). It is fair: everybody 
3. Moreover, “Users have become dependent on 
search engines, viewing them as authoritative and 
uses a search engine to find something. 
Nevertheless, it is also fair to ask for search 
(or web) neutrality.
Before investigating this aspect, it is 
useful to make some preliminary observa-
tions also from the methodological point 
of view in order to clarify the perspective 
of this paper. Search engines are the key 
information retrieval systems of the Infor-
mation Society and this field is not new 
for legal informatics4. By adopting such 
approach, law can be a meta-technology, 
as argued by Ugo Pagallo with reference 
to the “laws of robots”. In particular, he 
proposes “to approach the laws of the law 
establishing the conditions of legitimacy 
for the design, production, and use of 
robots, conceiving the law as meta-tech-
nology, i.e., as a means to govern other 
technological means” (Pagallo 2013: 
10). Thus, “once such tecnique regula-
tes other techniques and, moreover, the 
process of technological innovation, we 
may accordingly conceive the law as a 
meta-technology” (Pagallo 2013: 11).
With particular reference to search 
engines, it has to be considered that the 
cyberspace actually is a complex digital 
maze in which it is possible to retrieve 
any information stored. As the library of 
Babel, it may contain the solution to many 
problems (Amato Mangiameli 2000: 36). 
A search engine plays a key role: it is not 
just an information retrieval system, but 
reliable. Search engines have become the tools 
through which the democratic potential of the 
Internet can be advanced or hindered” (Laidlaw 
2008: 145).
4. Legal informatics always studied information 
retrieval systems and their legal issues. 
Technological advancements led to growing 
studies in the field of artificial intelligence in the 
legal field (including, but not limited to, legal 
reasoning and automated application of the law).
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rather it enables everyone to find any in-
formation, avoiding getting lost in billions 
of webnodes. It drives its users through 
paths that are not predetermined but 
instead dynamically generated in execu-
tion of many secret algorithms. The afore-
mentioned paths are made of hyperlinks; 
hypertext provides a means of non-se-
quential reading and thus it mimics “the 
brain’s ability to store and retrieve infor-
mation by referential links for quick and 
intuitive access” (Fiderio 1988: 237). 
However, automated activities of search 
engines not only modify human interac-
tion in cyberspace, but also control the 
information flow and build, in whole or in 
part, the digital identity of any person. In 
fact, despite the fact that the Internet and 
the Web are decentralized, some sites 
and services become essential nodes and 
shape the information society at a whole. 
As Yochai Benkler notes, “The emerging 
patterns of Internet use show that very few 
sites capture an exceedingly large amount 
of attention, and millions of sites go unno-
ticed. In this world, the Babel objection is 
perhaps avoided, but only at the expense 
of the very promise of the Internet as a 
democratic medium” (Benkler 2006: 10).
This is due to many factors, including 
the use of search engines. Thus, being 
at least listed in the SERP, firstly, and to 
be highly ranked, secondly, can lead to a 
virtuous or vicious circle.
It is a virtuous circle if (A) the search 
engine works properly, (B) listing is carried 
out in compliance with neutral rules, and 
(C) operations are correctly performed.
It is a vicious circle if the above condi-
tions are not met (for example, a rule is 
neutral and a content should be shown 
in the SERP, but a content is omitted in 
the SERP due to a software bug). This 
involves a series of questions: does a right 
to be indexed (or listed) exist and, if so, 
to be correctly indexed? Is there a legal 
relationship between search engine pro-
viders and content owners? What liability 
rule should be applied? How can neu-
trality and correctness be checked? Is it 
possible to impose specific legal duties to 
search engine providers and, if so, under 
what conditions?
Although it is difficult to answer these 
questions, it is necessary to investigate 
them deeply because search engines are 
the most important gatekeepers to digital 
information (texts, images, music, videos, 
etc.) and they usually provide other 
services linked to search.
Any search engine should put order 
among information, to avoid its users to 
be overwhelmed by them. However, today 
we risk being overwhelmed by search 
engines if the law is unable to regulate 
them.
2. Search engine as the 
Information Society 
fundamental expert system
Search engines work both as generalist 
(e.g., news) and as specialized gatekee-
pers (e.g., academic papers) to digital 
information and are a perfect means not 
only to get informed, buy products, and 
find resources, but also to sell advertising 
spaces. Moreover, vertical searches may 
be integrated within generic web search.
In all these cases, users choose between 
results by selecting one or more hyper-
links (links) listed in the SERP. The more 
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a content is highly ranked, the more easily 
users will select it.
Each search engine responds automatica-
lly to queries by showing results listed in 
order of relevance and pertinence. This is 
done by executing hundreds of top-secret 
algorithms. Only generic information upon 
them is public and thus it is not possible 
to evaluate if a search engine works in 
a neutral and fair way; in other words, 
it is very difficult, and often impossible, 
to check if the search engine reasoning 
may be deemed as neutral and correct. 
This is a matter of particular importance 
from the legal informatics perspective. 
Given the secrecy of the IT platform, it 
is only possible to make ex post deduc-
tions based on the analysis of the results 
and on the comparison with the content 
indexed or indexable. As a result, it is 
hard to challenge its results and unders-
tand if it is censoring specific web sites 
or results, or giving unfair advantage to its 
customers (i.e. who pays for advertising 
services): “opaque methods of ranking 
and rating online entities make it difficult 
for those who feel (and quite possibly are) 
wronged to press their case” (Pasquale 
2011: 382).
However, one author argues that legis-
lators could censor the “historically un-
precedented free search tools that help 
create enormous social value. It would 
be easy for regulators, even well-inten-
tioned ones, to inadvertently eliminate 
some of this value through misregulation. 
That outcome is worth fighting against” 
(Goldman 2011: 109-110). Nevertheless, 
these “search tools”: (a) are not really 
free (usually payment is done through 
personal information); (b) may (inadver-
tently or not) eliminate or censor content; 
(c) have social value but it does not imply 
that their providers should be exempted 
from any liability or accountability (should 
any social-oriented activity imply no ac-
countability? For instance, should an am-
bulance driver have no liability even if he/
she kills someone during his/her work?); 
(d) earn money indexing on line content 
not provided by them (sponsored search 
is related to organic search, whose content 
is provided by third party websites).
Search engines have to deal with many 
difficulties, ranging from the intrinsic am-
biguity of syntax, semantics and grammar, 
to the evolution of natural language and of 
computer code aimed at getting a better 
ranking in the SERP. In particular, natural 
language may not only evolve in relation 
to specific domains of knowledge but also 
be adapted to the Information Society and 
the Internet. One example is given by the 
growing number of SEO (Search Engine 
Optimization) services: content is written 
taking into account both human and auto-
mated readers. More generally, language 
tends to simplify and the art of rhetoric 
seems to be replaced by the wise use of 
keywords, hashtags, abbreviations, and 
so on. This makes the natural language 
poorer and may damage conceptualiza-
tion and reasoning.
In this framework, the search engine has 
the task to find and understand information, 
whether available in natural or computer 
language, making them easily accessible 
to its users. The ability in carrying out these 
tasks, and therefore search engine effi-
ciency, may lead to the success or failure 
of a search engine service. However, if 
a provider is so successful to achieve a 
dominant or monopolistic position certain 
legal duties may be, or are, imposed to it. 
Before investigating further this aspect, it 
is worth mentioning that since the early 
stages of computerization it was noticed 
that computers could store large amounts 
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of data and use them as inputs for algo-
rithm elaborations; inter alia, this made 
computer science focus also on the study 
of archives and databases management 
and use (Sartor 1990: 7).
With regard to search engines, the input 
stage consists in the acquisition of data 
not only by the so-called spiders or 
crawlers that travel through the Web, but 
also from other services in order to cus-
tomize the SERP: search history, interac-
tions with social networks, geolocation, 
calendar, etc.
A search engine, however, cannot be con-
sidered only as a complex database with 
a user interface that makes it possible to 
query it: it is an expert system instead. In 
fact, it is clear that a search engine runs 
tasks that require human intelligence, 
because it works both as an archivist and 
as a librarian and thus works as an expert 
(even if language and text understanding 
is a common sense task; Sartor 1990: 15). 
A search engine tracks, analyses, catalogs, 
and makes available links to, digital infor-
mation of different types in response to 
users’ queries. Therefore, it makes many 
choices and must faces many difficul-
ties, due to the diversity of information 
and of their sources. It goes well beyond 
the concept of database because such 
system must increasingly be automa-
ted and “intelligent”. It makes decisions 
and often seems willing to replace who 
queries it, going beyond a simple answer 
to a question through the provision of addi-
tional replies: search suggestions or au-
tomated conversion between currencies 
are good examples to show how a search 
engine service is now going beyond the 
mere context of information retrieval.
From another perspective, it seems to 
be confirmed what argued by Lawrence 
Lessig. He stated that “code writers are 
increasingly lawmakers. They determi-
ne what the defaults of the Internet will 
be; whether privacy will be protected; 
the degree to which anonymity will be 
allowed; the extent to which access will 
be guaranteed. They are the ones who set 
its nature. Their decisions, now made in 
the interstices of how the Net is coded, 
define what the Net is” (Lessig 2006: 79). 
Therefore, they define its real – albeit im-
material – structure to be used by present 
and future generations. As stated by Pa-
lombella following Vico and Dilthey, gene-
rally speaking, any individual is housed 
in a novel written by others in which may 
write his/her chapter (Palombella 2007: 
399). In the information society, however, 
it becomes more difficult because part of 
the novel is now written in an automated 
and sometimes unpredictable manner 
from some tools created by man: search 
engines.
3. Automation and 
subjectivity: some thoughts
Before investigating not only search neu-
trality but also the consequences of errors 
and decisions made by search engines, 
some notes on automation and subjecti-
vity may be useful.
Today, a search engine affects many 
aspects of everyday life. Autonomous 
software agents are a key component: 
they retrieve and analyze information, and 
answer to users’ queries. They are very 
important in the philosophical perspective 
of legal informatics also because semi-le-
gal relations are established among them 
(Faralli 2012: 81); their actions produce 
consequences for information society at a 
whole.
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We must distinguish between electronic 
agents that operate in the material and the 
virtual world. Robots act in the former and 
they have an artificial body. Perceptions 
and actions are related only to computer 
messages and data in the latter (Sartor 
2009: 19; also in Id. 2009); the same 
applies to search engines.
Several scholars denied the possibility of 
attributing legal personality to software 
agents because no rule would allow for 
this. Liability is thus traced in the sphere 
of the user or of its manufacturer a fortiori 
(Biasiotti, Romano, and Sagri 2002).
The assessment of the consequences of 
intelligent agents is much more difficult 
when they have no body, because while 
actions done by a robot result in acts 
that can be perceived, actions done by 
software agents are necessarily intangi-
ble and are invisible unless not displayed 
by an output device. However, search 
engines are an even more difficult case. 
Given the secrecy that hides every line 
of their code, it is only possible to make 
deductions based on their results and 
comparisons with the content indexed 
or indexable. Indeed, it is very difficult, 
if not almost impossible, to perceive any 
incorrect or illegal actions; it may happen 
only when their consequences are so 
obvious that cannot be hidden even if 
illegal operations are carried out. “The 
search algorithms are protected as trade 
secrets, and the reasons for manual 
manipulation of rankings, particularly in 
any given case, are not publicly or priva-
tely revealed. This results in a quagmire 
wherein businesses rely on the search 
results, yet have no access to understan-
ding changes in such results, even when 
the changes have a marked impact on 
the company’s sustainability” (Laidlaw 
2008: 137).
Several cases may occur: for example, 
a software agent may decide to exclude 
most of the pages of a site from the SERP 
without a valid motivation or, hypotheti-
cally, due to errors in the design and/or 
implementation of one or more algorithms 
(and/or of their interactions).
Two main issues arise. On the one hand, it 
is necessary to understand who should be 
liable for the actions of the software agent. 
On the other hand, it must be understood 
if the law can impose a duty upon the 
service provider and, if so, what characte-
ristics it should have; furthermore, it is ne-
cessary to understand if rules in force are 
sufficient or if lawmakers must act. It also 
worth mentioning that such issues have a 
wide scale and apply to several countries 
because search engine service is usually 
provided globally.
The second issue will be dealt with in para-
graph 5, while the first can be approached 
making reference to Sartor’s theory of 
software agents’ liability. “It seems that the 
guardian’s liability for the action of a SA 
cannot be grounded only upon the fact that 
a damage could be foreseen according to 
the “normal” laws of nature (or of techno-
logy). We need rather to consider whether 
the SA intentionally or negligently produced 
the damage. If we have indeed to draw this 
conclusion, then the liability of the user of 
a SA would be similar, rather than to liabi-
lity of a custodian of a thing, to vicarious 
liability (the liability of the employer for the 
employee). This form of liability is not based 
upon the fact that the employer could 
foresee the behaviour of the employee, but 
rather on the fact that the employee accom-
plished a tort, when acting in the course of 
the employment” (Sartor 2006: 22). After 
all, software programmers determined the 
system’s will and thus the effects of the 
actions of the latter must still be referred to 
Revista inteRnacional de Pensamiento Político - i ÉPoca - vol. 10 - 2015 - [395-410] - issn 1885-589X
401
its manufacturer (Borruso 1988: 253-255; 
see also Id. 1978).
Eventually, it is necessary to highlight 
another issue related to subjectivity: the 
impact of automation on subjectivity and 
personal identity building. Search engines 
draw the profile of a person by means of 
automated processing of data retrieved 
on the Internet. In such cases, one could 
argue that the search engine would be an 
isomorphic system because it knows only 
information provided by third parties and it 
does not provide new knowledge. Indeed, 
information is dynamically processed and 
built by means of software agents even 
in the SERP and this is even more true 
when additional services are offered, such 
as automated suggestions. This led to 
several proceedings5, in which the plaintiff 
sued the search engine provider alleging 
offensive expressions suggested with the 
name and surname of a person6, or the 
name of a company or an association7.
5. “Based on comparable assumptions, courts 
have upheld claims for inducement of copyright 
infringement and dismissed allegations of damage 
to reputation”; however, “no solid judicial trend can 
be assumed” (Karapapa and Borghi 2015: 263).
6. One good example is the “Bettina Wulff case” 
(settled in 2015): “Former German first lady 
Bettina Wulff has taken on Google over search 
terms that link to false rumors that she used to be 
a prostitute. The company argues that it generates 
such terms based on “objective factors,” but 
it’s not that simple. Google has suppressed 
undesirable results before in response to 
powerful lobby groups” (see Lischka 2012).
7. For example, the Tribunal of Milan uphold one 
claim for damage to reputation and ordered Google 
to remove the association of two words with one 
plaintiff’s name when using the autocomplete 
feature (Tribunal of Milan, 23 May 2013, as 
appeal judgement of Tribunal of Milan 25 March 
2013 – in which the allegation was dismissed).
There is another issue. As search engines 
become more complex, they also may 
provide content and services within each 
SERP depending on the query (e.g., 
traffic, weather predictions, calculations, 
currency conversions, etc.) and it can 
impact on organic search (and the neu-
trality of search engine providers that 
could advantage their services using their 
position).
4. Algorithms and software 
agents: choices, decisions, 
and errors of the search 
engine
Users who query a search engine expect 
it to respond correctly, i.e. listing the 
results in order of relevance8. If a legiti-
mate expectation to the above-mentioned 
correctness may be argued, how should 
it be shaped? Would it be sufficient to 
execute algorithms without software bugs? 
Or could nothing be claimed because no 
relevant legal provision could be expected 
by the service provider?
To respond appropriately it is necessary 
to quickly remember the concept of algo-
8. Obviously, “Any public interest in relevancy 
must be realistic. Businesses must expect 
fluctuations in rankings, and not every website 
can be highly ranked, nor is every undesirable 
link going to be caught and removed. Relevance is 
hard to measure, because it is as much dependent 
on the users search terms as it is on the algorithm 
of the provider, and results can be manipulated 
by google bombing, search engine optimisation 
and the like. For relevance to have meaning, the 
key is consistency: consistency in algorithms, 
consistency in decision-making regarding any 
manipulations of search results, and consistency in 
the values that drive such manual manipulation” 
(Laidlaw: 2008: 139).
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rithm. Indeed, a computer can perform 
only tasks that are reducible to an algo-
rithm: it is a sequence of prescriptions or 
‘instructions’ that indicates precisely and 
unambiguously the steps to take to resolve 
correctly a certain problem, starting from 
certain information, in a finite time.
In the case of software agents, their 
typical characteristics (proactivity and 
reactivity, behavioral flexibility, persisten-
ce over time, mobility, intelligence, ability 
to communicate) lead to difficulty or in-
ability to predict their behavior. In fact, 
the combination between the complexity 
of software agents and the richness of 
the environment in which they operate, 
makes it very difficult, if not impossible, 
to predict their behavior accurately. Efforts 
to predict them could “contradict the very 
reason for using an SA: delegating cogniti-
ve tasks” (Sartor 2006), but this may lead 
to more risks if they behave illicitly.
However, if we move from generic software 
agents to those used for providing search 
engine services, we see not only how 
problematic may be the profile of their 
choices and decisions, but also how easily 
mistakes and anomalies may occur. This 
has a severe impact on the growing debate 
on search (and web) neutrality. Before 
going deeper into these profiles, it is ne-
cessary to emphasize that search engine 
providers are in a role in which many 
benefits and risks coexist. It is objectively 
difficult to process billions of information 
properly by returning relevant results in 
response to billions of queries9. There is 
9. The Google case is emblematic: the size of 
its index amounts at more than 100,000,000 
of gigabytes, it customizes increasingly search 
results based on a multiplicity of parameters, 
it is used in more than 90% of web searches 
within the European Union (where it is a de facto 
monopolist), and so on.
too much information that would make 
impossible finding them without using 
automated means; thus, software agents 
are the delegates to carry out an activity 
that, by its very nature, needs be auto-
mated because there is a practical limit 
due both to the excessive number of infor-
mation and their rapid growth. However, 
great care must be taken. Vittorio Frosini 
noticed that computers act as an artificial 
eye built by people for people (Frosini 
1988: 75), but many times that eye is now 
provided by search engines: they decide 
what information is visible and therefore 
they may control and censor them.
As mentioned above, providers must 
delegate the execution of this service to 
software agents that operate in an envi-
ronment far too rich in information to be 
analyzed; furthermore, it is often optimi-
sed for search engines using SEO techni-
ques that become more extreme as time 
goes by. These automated tools are based 
on highly complex algorithms to provide 
relevant and useful results to a plurality of 
persons: how may they understand what 
is actually sought by each user and how 
to interpret his/her intentions?
In any case, the engine must make 
choices that involve several evaluations 
affecting not just the scope of mere infor-
mation retrieval (now automated) (phase 
1) but rather that of their analysis (phase 
2) and dynamic generation of each SERP 
in response to each query (phase 3). 
While current technologies do not meet 
particular obstacles in carrying out infor-
mation retrieval operations (phase 1), it 
is still extremely difficult make a system 
evolve from a purely formal knowledge 
to a substantial one. Although techno-
logical advancements are well known, 
much has yet to be done with regard to 
phases 2 and 3. This is due to the fact that 
Revista inteRnacional de Pensamiento Político - i ÉPoca - vol. 10 - 2015 - [395-410] - issn 1885-589X
403
modern search engines perform syntactic 
operations and semantic analysis of texts 
running multiple algorithms, in addition to 
contextualize them within the framework 
of cyberspace and therefore to assess 
their “popularity” using special algorithms 
(generally referred to the quantity and 
quality of links to a particular resource). 
A fundamental activity is therefore related 
to the analysis of each information and, in 
particular, of text trying to hopefully ensure 
neutrality at the same time. However, even 
the interpretation of a text may not be a 
neutral and objective activity, because 
interpretation requires a prior understan-
ding, as stated by Gadamer. Thus, neu-
trality may be deemed as a utopia; if neu-
trality cannot be ensured, exemption from 
liability should never be claimed and thus 
service provider could not benefit from it.
According to Eric Goldman, search neu-
trality cannot be achieved: “the term 
“search neutrality” implies the existence 
of neutral search engines, but those are 
entirely mythical. Every search engine 
design choice necessarily and unavoida-
bly reflects normative values. Thus, the 
term “search neutrality” implies a Platonic 
ideal of a search engine that cannot be 
achieved. Naturally, then, Google’s practi-
ces fail to conform to this Platonic ideal, but 
so does every other search engine in the 
real world” (Goldman 2011: 107). Search 
engine service providers would never be 
held liable because neutrality could not be 
reached; in addition, it may also happens 
because some rules may be interpre-
ted to give them a (too) wide protection 
(Supreme Court of California 2014). In 
addition, it could be argued that, in this 
task, the consequences of the actions of 
the agents are unpredictable because not 
only texts but also queries are not fore-
seeable and are beyond any control of the 
provider. Moreover, one could argue that 
there is no right to be indexed and that 
a search engine provider would not have 
any legal obligation towards users who 
query the search engine as well towards 
subjects whose information is analyzed 
and indexed.
However, search neutrality is not a 
Platonic ideal and the whole issue can be 
analyzed in another perspective: such rea-
soning would exempt an entire category 
of subjects from any liability making them 
legibus solutus in the provisioning of a 
crucial service of the Information Society; 
furthermore, such service is provided for 
profit by private entities.
Thus, it is possible to answer to the men-
tioned opinions arguing, firstly, that free 
speech protection cannot be taken on an 
extreme level, making a subject always 
exempt from liability despite any possible 
mistake and that many legal systems 
balance free speech and neminem 
laedere. Furthermore, until now free 
speech has been crucial in exempting 
search engine providers from liability in 
the U.S., but the European framework is 
more complex and it may shape the near 
future, as the Google Spain case shows.
Secondly, even in the case of unpredict-
ability, any damage must be compensated 
from the provider who controls the service 
(as already happens with reference to 
several regimes of liability: for instance, 
custodian’s liability (Sartor 2006) or strict 
liability (Pagallo 2009).
Thirdly, a right to be listed, and to be cor-
rectly listed, in organic search may be 
argued if the concept of “correctness” 
is investigated; in particular, any search 
engine provider claims to index and rank 
content objectively and neutrally, without 
discriminating anyone in the organic 
Revista inteRnacional de Pensamiento Político - i ÉPoca - vol. 10 - 2015 - [395-410] - issn 1885-589X
404
search, while sponsored search obvi-
ously works in a different way. Thus, such 
provider accepts autonomously a legal 
obligation to answer to users’ queries in 
a neutral and non-discriminatory manner. 
Only a search engine provider that does 
not have a dominant or monopolistic 
position may choose to provide a non-
neutral service, but this business model 
is not used today and it should be make 
clear to its users.
It is necessary to emphasize that any 
search engine depends on the content 
that it indexes, because organic search 
is the “Trojan horse” to sell advertising 
spaces used in the sponsored search 
(i.e., the results shown together with the 
SERP). After all, even sponsored search 
depends on the SERP composition.
From a legal point of view, there are no 
problems in the structure of the aforemen-
tioned model if neutrality and impartiality 
are guaranteed in the organic search and 
the sponsored search is not deceptive. 
However, “The problem would be with 
search engines that mix the two strategies 
and hide the mix, or with a monopolistic 
search engine” (Castells 2009); moreover, 
search engines contribute to shape “the 
black box society”: this metaphor refers 
both to recording systems and ones whose 
workings are mysterious (Pasquale 2015).
Therefore, it is crucial to ensure the neu-
trality of the choices and decisions of the 
search engine (and therefore of the neu-
trality of indexing tasks), especially when 
its provider has a dominant or monopo-
listic position, with obvious consequences 
from a legal point of view. The first issue 
will be analyzed in paragraph 5 and it 
can be anticipated that the only way to 
ensure neutrality consists in the possibil-
ity to evaluate the reasoning made by the 
search engine. This problem is connect-
ed to the second, because it is going to 
affect a private space that is generally not 
challenged by third parties or by a court 
unless there are no clues or evidences 
of an illicit behavior of the engine. None-
theless, the legal approach to the issue 
should change if an entity has a dominant 
or monopolistic position, especially if it is 
reasonable to believe that the same entity 
may abuse or is abusing its position. 
In such case, competition law plays a 
primary role and antitrust authorities (and 
sometimes the courts) are the only power 
capable to oppose to an economic and 
technological power. In fact, if a search 
engine has a dominant or a monopolistic 
position, it also has enormous powers, not 
only economic, because it has the power 
of techno-exclusion. Those who control 
the gateway to the Cyberspace have a 
power that is paradoxically real albeit in-
tangible. It may not only exclude at will 
but also build a digital profile suitable of 
damaging a person or an entity; further-
more, it may orient opinions and beliefs 
on certain issues simply showing certain 
links in prominent positions and hiding or 
low-ranking others.
The last profile, in particular, highlights 
the issue of so-called SERP ranking. Its 
utmost importance is well known: if a web 
site is low ranked, probably it will not be 
found by users. Moreover, in many cases 
the search engine decides that specific 
pages are not shown by default even if 
they have been indexed: this is the case 
of omitted results.
Besides, the search engine may decide 
to match one or more terms to others. 
However, it should be done in an au-
tomated, objective, and neutral way to 
avoid that the search engine service may 
translate into a dictatorship in the control 
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of information. It can even lead to their 
partial censorship and therefore to affect 
fundamental rights. For example, many 
web pages can be reached difficultly 
outside of a specific country if queries 
are done by another country, because the 
search engine assumes that they are of no 
interest to them (this is done by executing 
an algorithm that locates the user using 
various parameters such as IP address 
and browser language). It is legitimate to 
ask, therefore, whether the extreme cus-
tomization of web search can bring back 
the same concept of space that was made 
obsolete and evanescent by the Internet 
and the Web, and one may wonder 
whether this is good or bad.
Eventually, another issue must be added 
to this framework: the consideration of 
search engine errors and of their effects. 
A computer is by no means infallible, 
above all due to its software rather than 
due to its hardware (but both can be de-
fective). Daily life, however, is increasingly 
pervaded and controlled by a variety of 
software, which also show to be likely to 
make clear mistakes. This does not only 
refer to ranking manipulation for po-
litical activism (as in the case of “Google 
bombing”: e.g., in 2004 the query “miser-
able failure” returned the biography of the 
U.S. President George W. Bush as the first 
result), but also to bugs and malfunctions 
that can affect the correct operation of the 
search engine. As a result, a search engine 
can wrongly rank web pages or even hide 
them because it has decided so.
In such cases, is the error due to an al-
gorithm or to its implementation? Or may 
it rather arise in the interaction among a 
multiplicity of algorithms that lead to un-
expected results or abnormal behaviors? 
Were errors or abnormal behaviors ab-
stractly predictable?
There are no doubts about the liability of 
the service provider for any harmful con-
sequences, but it is clear that the overall 
analysis of these issues goes far beyond 
the scope of statutory damages and 
touches a fundamental aspect of contem-
porary society because it is related both to 
access to an essential infrastructure (the 
Web) and to freedom of information. In 
fact, “In a democratic society, those who 
control access to information have a res-
ponsibility to support the public interest. 
By dint of their power over such an im-
portant resource, these gatekeepers must 
assume an obligation as trustees of the 
greater good. Indeed, barring some clear 
showing that they are bearing this burden 
voluntarily, government should impose it 
upon them” (Shapiro 1999: 225). In fact, 
the idea that search engines are merely 
‘businesses’ or ‘promotional services for 
website owners’ is untenable. If informa-
tion is becoming a critical commodity in 
modern society, then such bodies that 
manage access to information, that are 
tools for public discourse and democra-
cy, should be accountable to the public. 
When the structure for access shapes 
meaning for its users, and influences 
public opinion, this need for a public-
interest obligation is magnified” (Laidlaw 
2008: 137).
5. Neutrality or dictatorship 
of the algorithm?
Search engine providers may control and 
censor digital information but the legal fra-
mework is still focused on liability exemp-
tion and de-listing of certain contents 
(see European Court of Justice 2014). In 
the U.S. context, the legal debate starts 
from the choice of considering a search 
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engine provider such as a “conduit” or 
an “editor”: “on search bias claims […], 
the conduit theory is a recipe for regula-
tion, while the editor theory offers a First-
Amendment get-out-of-jail-free card. 
Google instead ought to be an active and 
opinionated editor, sifting through the 
Internet and using expert judgment to 
identify the important and the interesting. 
These two theories form the rhetorical 
backdrop to the ongoing legal battles over 
search. But when the issue is defamation, 
the conduit theory holds Google harmless 
for the sins of the websites it unknowingly 
connects users to, while the editor theory 
calls down the vengeance of the heavens 
on Google for its editorial decisions” 
(Grimmelmann 2014: 871).
However, once again it is necessary to 
emphasize that they are the most impor-
tant intermediaries between online infor-
mation and users. In fact, the provision 
of this service provides a huge power: 
control of information through the faculty 
to make them available and to decide how 
easily make them available. There is no 
doubt that the algorithms are increasingly 
sophisticated and that current techniques 
are extremely fine, making it possible even 
to customize each SERP on the basis of 
many criteria, not just geographical, even 
with ad hoc automated customization.
To date, search engine providers are prac-
tically exempt from liability, almost as if the 
algorithms used for providing the service 
were not realized by the same entities who 
earn relevant profits from them.
As anticipated, owners of web sites and 
data indexed have the right that this ope-
ration is carried out correctly because 
they provide the content that the search 
engine provider uses not only to provide 
such a service, but also to sell advertising 
space. In fact, without organic results, 
sponsored research would not make 
any sense because it can be reasona-
bly assumed that nobody would use that 
specific search engine (the model of pay 
per click engines is not used anymore). In 
particular, given the central role of search 
engines in the Information Society, rules 
must be set to balance freedom of infor-
mation and of economic initiative (and in-
dustrial property rights).
It is necessary to define policies aimed 
at protecting individuals and businesses 
harmed by automated decisions of search 
engines, going beyond the recent decision 
on the right to be forgotten. It is unaccep-
table that search engine providers are 
practically exempt from liability due to 
errors of their agents (so presumably due 
to errors in algorithms or abnormal beha-
viors resulting from their implementation 
and/or their interaction). In particular, 
control mechanisms should be implemen-
ted to verify the correctness of the work of 
software agents (such as, but not limited 
to, the ability to verify the reasoning). The 
secrecy surrounding such systems is ex-
tremely risky for the impossibility of pro-
tecting persons and business damaged 
by them. It is very difficult to prove intent 
or negligence of a service provider for the 
conduct of its digital agents, except in 
case of clear errors. Even in such case, 
absolute secrecy may make difficult 
to obtain the proof that a problem has 
been truly solved (e.g., not simply in its 
external manifestation in the SERP) or 
that hypothetically the SERP is built to 
promote its own services or its customers. 
Furthermore, “Particularly in a field as 
dynamic and complex as search, it may 
prove beyond the institutional competen-
ce of courts unable to deal with rapidly 
shifting business practices occluded by 
Revista inteRnacional de Pensamiento Político - i ÉPoca - vol. 10 - 2015 - [395-410] - issn 1885-589X
407
trade secret protection. All these factors 
point toward the development of a public 
opinion in search, or a more regulatory 
approach, including teams of lawyers, 
engineers and programmers, that would 
complement existing litigation and com-
petition” (Pasquale 2011: 405).
A paradox is clear. ICTs may make society 
more transparent also because a diffuse 
control upon power is more easily achie-
vable. However, when the algorithm 
becomes the very foundation of the power 
exercised by a subject, as in the case of 
Google, and everything it is enveloped by 
the utmost secrecy, then we are really in 
front of the new version of arcana imperii, 
which protect not only the business 
activity, but also control life itself, directly 
or indirectly. In addition, the consultation 
of one or more profiles, or otherwise of 
any content type, now depends from al-
gorithms that decide what can be shown 
in response to users’ queries. Persons 
should not be subject to the dictatorship of 
the algorithm, in which the decision maker 
is replaced by automated procedures and 
the person disappears, turned into an 
object of uncontrollable powers (Rodotà 
2014: 37-38). This is even truer when the 
person affected or excluded does not have 
the strength to make his/her voice heard, 
put in between the market and the tech-
nology. “In this market of markets, there 
is likely to be little incentive to ensure in-
clusion of these small markets and only 
a small cost (in loss of participation) for 
their exclusion” (Introna and Nissenbaum 
2000: 177).
Therefore, ensuring neutrality in the 
provisioning of search engine service 
is a fundamental goal. Indeed, “Web-
search mechanisms are too important 
to be shaped by the marketplace alone” 
(Introna and Nissenbaum 2000: 176)10. 
Emily B. Laidlaw proposes a framework of 
accountability for search engines’ practi-
ces: “Three values should be present in 
such a framework: the value of relevant 
and unbiased search results; the value 
of a degree of transparency concerning 
algorithms and reasons for manual mani-
pulation, and respect for the dignity of the 
users recognizing that how information is 
presented on indices can cause harm” 
(Laidlaw 2008: 145).
Legal issues are different and touch ex-
tremely delicate aspects, with particu-
lar regard to liability for the conduct of 
third parties, to the potential abuse of a 
dominant or monopolistic position, the 
protection of freedom, and the potential 
conflict with freedom of economic initiative 
of the service provider. Legislators cannot 
remain idle. It is true that the law (tries to) 
regulate cyberspace, with mixed fortunes. 
Nevertheless, the new technological cha-
llenge of avoiding the dictatorship of the 
algorithm has not been effectively taken. 
10. “They provide essential access to the Web both 
to those with something to say and offer and to 
those wishing to hear and find. Our concern is with 
the evident tendency of many of the leading search 
engines to give prominence to popular, wealthy, 
and powerful sites at the expense of others. This 
they do through the technical mechanisms of 
crawling, indexing, and ranking algorithms as well 
as through human-mediated trading of prominence 
for a fee. As long as this tendency continues, we 
expect these political effects will become more 
acute as the Web expands. We regret this tendency 
not because it goes against our personal norms of 
fair play but because it undermines a substantive 
ideal –the substantive vision of the Web as an 
inclusive democratic space. This ideal Web is 
not merely a new communications infrastructure 
offering greater band– width, speed, massive 
connectivity, and more, but also a platform for 
social justice” (Introna and Nissenbaum 2000: 
181).
Revista inteRnacional de Pensamiento Político - i ÉPoca - vol. 10 - 2015 - [395-410] - issn 1885-589X
408
This topic is likely to stimulate the debate 
between those who do not want any limi-
tation (the service provider and those who 
believe that any restriction is an attack to 
the freedom of the net) and those who 
want to put severe limits (many subjects 
having different interests). The fragmen-
tation of the opponents and the unity of 
providers are accompanied by a society 
in which individuals are usually not skilled 
enough to understand both legal and in-
formatics profiles, being them complex 
and challenging.
However, the power resulting from the use 
of digital agents and the profits earned 
by using them are benefits that must be 
accompanied by accountability for their 
use, as well as by the need to ensure 
fairness and neutrality. A constant and 
careful consideration is therefore neces-
sary to prevent search engine providers to 
consolidate their dictatorial and censorial 
powers; they provide a fundamental and 
essential tool for accessing the vast and 
growing amount of digital information, 
regardless of their form. However, any 
search engine depends on the content 
that it indexes, because the organic (free) 
search is a Trojan horse for the sponsored 
search (paid by advertisers) and for other 
services. This is perfectly legitimate, as 
long as neutrality, transparency and ob-
jectivity are guaranteed, while the presen-
tation of sponsored results must not be 
misleading or intended to mislead users.
Moreover, organic search must work 
properly, to avoid excluding both busines-
ses (that would be forced to pay for the 
sponsored search in order to appear) and 
people who use digital tools outside of 
their profession.
To ensure that the conditions set out 
above would be necessary, firstly, to 
impose a duty of transparency about the 
algorithms used and their concrete imple-
mentation (see Introna and Nissenbaum 
2000: 181)11; secondly, to make possible 
the analysis of the reasoning that led a 
search engine to make its decisions. This 
does not mean the possibility to use the 
code by third parties, but only to study it 
and make sure that the neutrality of the 
search engine is effective and not only 
claimed. Any objections related to security 
and to the ability to exploit this knowled-
ge to illegal or illegitimate purposes can 
be overcome by mentioning a well-known 
fact: the remarkable spread of open-sour-
ce software commonly used in many areas 
and for many years without that security 
issues could be considered more serious 
than the ones of proprietary software.
Moreover, the person cannot be overwhel-
med by the entity or the entities who 
control the digital tools. In 1964 Norbert 
Wiener said that “the future offers very 
little hope for those who expect that our 
new mechanical slaves will offer us a 
world in which we may rest from thinking. 
Help us they may, but at the cost of 
supreme demands upon our honesty 
and our intelligence. The world of the 
future will be an ever more demanding 
struggle against the limitations of our in-
telligence, not a comfortable hammock in 
which we can lie down to be waited upon 
by our robot slaves” (Wiener 1964: 69). 
11. According to Emily B. Laidlaw, “the negative 
consequences of disclosure of algorithms on the 
market as sufficiently concerning that blanket 
transparency should not be the solution. Further 
investigation is required to determine the potential 
market fallout of full algorithmic transparency. 
However, disclosure should be required regarding 
manual manipulations” (Laidlaw 2008: 139). In 
addition, it may also be argued that disclosure 
should be imposed at least when errors and 
malfunctions are reasonably clear.
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However, new computer systems (rectius, 
those who control them) sometimes bring 
persons not to think. So, provocatively 
and almost as a joke, Larry Page (co-
founder of Google) stated that the objec-
tive is to ensure that Google can answer 
a question before it is asked, while Hal 
Varian (Google’s chief economist) has ba-
sically stated that, albeit partially, a similar 
function is already offered through the 
convergence of certain services12.
An additional contribution may result from 
constant cooperation in a multidiscipli-
nary development of search engine. The 
development of search engines should 
be made with the contribution, in particu-
lar, of philosophers and jurists who may 
help ensuring respect for fundamental 
freedoms and rights (Introna and Nis-
senbaum 2000: 181). Moreover, search 
engines should be built following a neu-
trality by design principle.
In conclusion, it is clear that we cannot 
focus solely on reflections on de-listing 
and on the right to be digitally forgotten, 
12. “We all thought he was joking but Larry‘s 
vision has been realized by Google Now, an 
application that runs on Android phones. One day 
my phone buzzed and I looked at a message from 
Google Now. It said: “Your meeting at Stanford 
starts in 45 minutes and the traffic is heavy, so you 
better leave now.” The kicker is that I had never 
told Google Now about my meeting. It just looked 
at my Google Calendar, saw where I was going, 
sent my current location and destination to Google 
Maps, and figured out how long it would take me 
to get to my appointment given current traffic 
conditions. Some people think that’s the coolest 
thing in the world, and others are just completely 
freaked out by it. The issue is that Google Now has 
to know a lot about you and your environment to 
provide these services. This worries some people. 
But, of course, I share highly private information 
with my doctor, lawyer, accountant, trainer, and 
others because I receive identifiable benefits and 
I trust them to act in my interest” (Varian 2013).
but instead investigate the matter further. 
An obligation to properly index on line 
content should be expressly regulated. 
From a legal point of view and on the 
basis of the arguments presented in this 
paper, a general duty to correct indexing 
is already in force; search engine service 
providers must act in a neutral and 
non-discriminatory way. This obligation 
becomes even more compelling if such 
provider has a dominant or monopolistic 
position, so certain limitations may be 
more easily imposed thanks to antitrust 
laws.
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